Wednesday, 23 July 2014
Designing Truthful Spectrum Double Auctions with Local Markets
DESIGNING TRUTHFUL SPECTRUM DOUBLE AUCTIONS WITH LOCAL MARKETS
Market-driven spectrum auctions offer an efficient way to improve spectrum utilization by transferring unused or under-used spectrum from its primary license holder to spectrum-deficient secondary users. Such a spectrum market exhibits strong locality in two aspects: 1) that spectrum is a local resource and can only be traded to users within the license area, and 2) that holders can partition the entire license areas and sell any pieces in the market. We design a spectrum double auction that incorporates such locality in spectrum markets, while keeping the auction economically robust and computationally efficient. Our designs are tailored to cases with and without the knowledge of bid distributions. Complementary simulation studies show that spectrum utilization can be significantly improved when distribution information is available. Therefore, an auctioneer can start from one design without any a priori information, and then switch to the other alternative after accumulating sufficient distribution knowledge. With minor modifications, our designs are also effective for a profit-driven auctioneer aiming to maximize the auction revenue.
In order to utilize such idle channels and to improve their utilization, it is critical to design sufficient incentives that encourage primary license holders to allow other spectrumdeficient users to access these channels. It is intuitive to observe that under-used channels have values that can be efficiently determined by a market, governed by spectrum auctions. If designed well, a spectrum auction offers an efficient way to create a market: it attracts both license holders and wireless users to join, and to either buy o sell idle channels in the market. Once a transaction is conducted, the seller (license holder) earns extra income by leasing unused channels to the buyer (wireless user), who pays to obtain the channel access.
DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:
v Spectrum auctions are designed in the sense of the global market all channels are accessible to all users, no matter where they are.
v District extends Myerson’s virtual valuations to double auctions and designs a market with a discriminatory pricing policy — different auction winners might face different charges or payments.
We present District, a set of new spectrum double auctions that are specifically designed for local spectrum markets. With District, a license holder can freely partition its entire license area and either sell or reserve spectrum in local markets, based on their own requirements. Moreover, District allows the same channel to be shared by multiple wireless users if no interference occurs. We believe that it is crucial for District to maintain basic properties of economic robustness (truthfulness in particular). As a matter of fact, introducing the notion of local markets imposes non-trivial challenges when economic robustness is to be maintained.
ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM:
v However, all works above discuss auction designs in the sense of global markets, where all channels to be auctioned off is globally accessible to all spectrum buyers, no matter where they are.
v Such ignorance of the geographic locality of spectrum resources made them incapable to accommodate he demand of the recent push of database-driven spectrum markets, in which channels are traded to local users within the seller-defined license area.
Speed - 1.1 Ghz
RAM - 512 MB(min)
Hard Disk - 40 GB
Key Board - Standard Windows Keyboard
Mouse - Two or Three Button Mouse
Monitor - LCD/LED
Operating system : Windows XP.
Coding Language : .Net
Data Base : SQL Server 2005
Tool : VISUAL STUDIO 2008.
YWei Wang, Student, Ben Liang, Senior, and Baochun Li, Senior _, “Designing Truthful Spectrum Double Auctions with Local Markets” IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL. 13, NO. 1, Jan 2014